**1NC Tradeoff**

**US security cooperation is focused on Taiwan now**

**Menendez and Graham 6/17/2022**

[U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), “MENENDEZ, GRAHAM INTRODUCE COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION TO OVERHAUL U.S.-TAIWAN POLICY”, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/menendez-graham-introduce-comprehensive\_legislation-to-overhaul-us-taiwan-policy]

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) announced they have introduced the bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act of 2022. The new legislation, which comes in the wake of last week’s threats by Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe’s that China will “not hesitate to start a war” and “smash to smithereens” Taiwan, represents the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy towards Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The bipartisan proposal expands U.S. efforts to promote the security of Taiwan, ensures regional stability, and deters further People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression against Taiwan. The legislation also imposes steep costs on the PRC for hostile action against Taiwan by setting up a broad economic sanctions regime. Specifically, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 creates a new initiative to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities, providing almost $4.5 billion in security assistance over the next four years. The bill also bolsters support for Taiwan’s democratic government; provides additional support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and in multilateral trade architecture; takes concrete steps to counter PRC’s aggressive coercion and influence campaigns; creates a Taiwan Fellowship Program; and designates Taiwan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Under U.S. law, a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status designation is a **powerful symbol** that provides our closest global partners with additional benefits in the areas of defense trade and **security cooperation**. “As Beijing continues to seek to coerce and isolate Taiwan there should be no doubt or ambiguity about the depth and strength of our determination to stand with the people of Taiwan and their democracy,” said Chairman Menendez. “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 represents a seminal statement of the United States’ absolute commitment to stand with Taiwan and all those who share our interests and our values in the Indo-Pacific in the face of Beijing’s military, economic, and diplomatic threats and bullying. The United States and our partners have a **critical window of opportunity** to reinvigorate our diplomatic strategy to assure cross-Strait stability and security and to work with Taipei to modernize their military; embed them in the region’s economic architecture; combat Beijing’s political influence and misinformation campaigns; and develop deeper ties between our two peoples. I thank Senator Graham for working with me on this landmark legislation to send a clear message to Beijing not to make the same mistakes with Taiwan that Vladimir Putin has made in Ukraine.” “I’m very pleased to be working with Senator Menendez to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Our bill is the largest expansion of the military and economic relationship between our two countries in decades,” said Senator Graham. “When it comes to Taiwan, our response should be that we are for democracy and against communist aggression. We live in dangerous times. China is sizing up America and our commitment to Taiwan. The danger will only grow worse if we show weakness in the face of Chinese threats and aggression toward Taiwan. I’m hopeful we will receive large bipartisan support for our legislation and that the Biden Administration will sign on in support.”

**The plan’s spending trades off – R&D in Europe takes focus and resources away from East Asia – the impact is war over Taiwan**

\*Answers “we solve because we’re good for heg”

**Colby 3/28/2022**

[Elbridge A., principal at The Marathon Initiative. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict from Yale University Press, “More Spending Alone Won’t Fix the Pentagon’s Biggest Problem”, https://time.com/6161573/us-defense-budget-strategy/]

Fourth, we need to spend a higher fraction of our defense budget on dealing with China in Asia, **limiting** our ability to pursue **dominance in other theaters.** This is because we should spend more than merely a bare plausible minimum on China, particularly ensuring our forces are able to prevail in the Pentagon’s “pacing scenario”—Taiwan. The **stakes** of a war in the world’s most important region between the globe’s two superpowers are **too great and the uncertainty** of how such a great power war would unfold **too profound**. Accordingly, we should spend enough on dealing with China to be very confident we could successfully deny Beijing the ability to subordinate a U.S. ally or Taiwan. In practical terms, this means we should hedge by constructing both long-range strike capabilities less vulnerable to Chinese preemption and resilient forward-deployed forces, not only to build redundancy into our plans but also to impose dilemmas on Beijing’s planning and galvanize allied efforts. The upshot of this is that a greater portion of any defense spending increases should go to Asia than many realize, constraining our ability to pursue multi-theater dominance. Fifth, we also need to acknowledge that there are **no easy routes** to restoring global military dominance. The reality is that **military investments** in today’s environment **are less multipurpose** or fungible **than some contend**. Fundamentally, we are not preparing for, say, simultaneous wars against 1990s Iraq and North Korea, over whom our armed forces would dominate, swinging forces such as bombers, tankers, and carriers as needed between the conflicts to address whatever deficiencies might arise. Rather, we are dealing with great powers. In this context, our **military investments are much more often zero-sum—they do trade off against each other**. This is partially because of probable attrition. If we are to be prudent in planning for a war with China or Russia, we must assume that our forces would take significant losses, including in the key war-winning capabilities needed to prevail and where our scarcity is most acute. Vital systems like B-2 stealth bombers, attack submarines, satellites, and possibly even aircraft carriers would be lost and critical munitions like long-range anti-ship missiles and land-attack air-launched missiles expended in considerable numbers. Such losses would, if we did not have adequate stocks of replacements, make us highly vulnerable in a second—let alone third—theater, possibly for years given the timelines required for replenishing these forces. It is also because even those forces that do survive are more likely to be fixed in a given region or for a particular conflict, **limiting their flexibility.** This is at root because **a war with a China or Russia would be a much different affair** than, say, defeating the Iraqi military in 2003. Fighting a great power would almost certainly be much tougher and take a considerably longer time in its critical phases—much more a matter of a hard slog simply to prevail in the conventional military contest than a quick shock and awe campaign. In such a context, we would not want to have to remove critical forces from one unfinished fight to go to deal with another conflict. This is a very real dynamic: Germany decided to pull forces from the Western Front in summer 1914 to deal with Russia, and this may have made the difference between victory and stalemate—indeed, ultimately Germany’s defeat. Furthermore, forces like attack submarines and surface vessels may not be physically able to transition between theaters in the relevant timeframes. If critical fights happen in concurrent timeframes, as was the case in 1914 and again in the Second World War, key systems may not be able to move fast enough between theaters. And the transit of any forces might well be inhibited by the actions of our opponents, further limiting our ability to swing them between theaters. The upshot of this is that, in order to be able to fight two concurrent major power wars, we would need to buy much more than just one set of major war-winning capabilities. This means a much greater expense is required to deal with the potential for concurrent conflicts with both China and Russia, let alone other threats like Iran and North Korea.

**US weakness in Asia causes nuclear war**

**Kapila 2019**

[Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, with a Masters in Defence Science (Madras University) and a PhD in Strategic Studies (Allahabad University) Combines a rich experience of Army (Brigadier) and diplomatic assignments in major countries."United States’ Potent Existential Crisis: The China Threat – Analysis." <https://www.eurasiareview.com/18012019-united-states-potent-existential-crisis-the-china-threat-analysis/>]

The ‘China Threat ‘emerging in 2018 in comprehensive and diverse manifestations poses an **existential crisis** challenging not only the continuance of **U**nited **S**tates as the global **unipolar Superpower** but also targeted with intended consequences of prompting the **U**nited **S**tates to retreat into isolation within its continental confines. The United States has long ignored the China Threat to the detriment of United States own national security but also to the security of US Allies and strategic partners. The acid test of a nations’ strategic greatness lies not only in checkmating a threat in existence to its national security but also being vigilant to a ‘Threat in the Making’, as I would put it. The United States is guilty of the latter in relation to China. China has reached this stage of posing a potent existential challenge to the United States mainly due to United States own acts of strategic omission and commission. United States misreading of China’s long range intentions has not only facilitated the emergence of a China Threat to United States but also United States permissive attitudes on China facilitated to create two ‘rogue nuclear weapons state’ of Pakistan and North Korea as its proxy cats-paws against US Allies and strategic partners. China is unlikely to succeed in achieving ‘strategic equivalence’ that it seeks with the United States in the foreseeable future nor are the Major Powers of the world, including Japan and India, likely to accede ‘American Exceptionalism’ to China despite its burgeoning military power. This for the simple reason that I have been stressing in my writings for two decades and that is China has no Natural Allies like the United States. For detailed analysis on the subject, kindly read my Book, “China-India Military Confrontation: 21st Century Perspectives” (2015) Chapter 13 ‘China’s Giant Leap for Superpower Status in 21st Century: Geopolitical Implications’. However, China will in the 21st Century with great persistence, and unmindful of the prevailing reality, that China is besieged today from both within and without, China will continue to challenge United States global predominance and specifically Indo Pacific predominance with greater potency. The **U**nited **S**tates has belatedly woken upto the reality that what they attempted to market globally for decades that China can be co-opted as a responsible stakeholder in global security and stability was a **mirage**. Long years of United States ‘China **Hedging** Strategy’ and ‘**Risk Aversion** Strategy’ made China only more **recalcitrant** and fed Chinese **misperceptions** that **U**nited **S**tates global power is on the decline. United States policy formulations of this decade of a ‘Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific’ and the recent emphasis on Indo Pacific Security Blueprint are seemingly belated but welcome steps to checkmate China’s unrestrained flexing of its military muscle as evident in the South China Sea. Chinese President **Xi** Jinping’s call on Chinese Armed Forces to prepare for an **all- out war** are not **defensive** calls by a besieged nation but like **Hitlerian Germany**, these are offensive calls of a **revisionist power**. Annexation of Taiwan by use of military force seems to be **China’s aim** today. This has a larger aim of challenging **U**nited **S**tates **resolve** and **determination** to maintain its Superpower status. China has placed the United States on the horns of a strategic dilemma where the **U**nited **S**tates will be damned if it does not militarily intervene to defend Taiwan and if it does so it risks a **full-fledged war with China.** China is gambling on the United States shying away from the latter option. Right from the turnover of the 19th Century till today no major power, not even Nazi Germany, has dared to challenge the United States predominance, geopolitically and strategically, as China is now engaged in doing so. Even at the height of the Cold War 1945-91 when the United States and the Former Soviet Union were involved in a bitter ideological struggle one did not witness the unfolding of the type of China’s ‘Grand Strategy Blueprint’ decades in the making and operationalising, to initially unravel United States security architecture in Asia Pacific, and graduated now to a more vividly clear reality in 2019 that China is on the avowed path of emerging as the ‘sole challenger ‘of United States predominance and exceptionalism. That China could geopolitically and strategically engage in the execution of such a blueprint unchallenged arose fundamentally from United States flawed policy decisions spread over many US Administrations. Such flawed US policy decisions sprung from misconceived American readings of China’s long range strategic intentions and short-term American geopolitical expediency subjugating and distorting United States strategic vision of the ‘China Threat’ to United States national security. The United States ‘original sin’ in relation to the latent China Threat to US national security can be placed on shoulders of US President Truman who ignored General MacArthur’s dire warnings on China and petulantly dismissed General MacArthur from the command of UN Forces in Korea. If Japan today after decades since 1945 continues as the United States most enduring and steadfast Ally, it has a lot to do with General MacArthur’s visionary zeal. The second most serious sin in relation to flawed US policy decisions was inflicted by US President Richard Nixon in 1972 egged by his Sinophiles Secretary of States Henry Kissinger. To spite the Former USSR the United States in 1972 endowed an unwarranted international legitimacy on China despite its disruptive credentials and thereafter followed as to what could be termed as a China Appeasement policy. The third sin was committed at the turn of the Millennium when US President Bush in his messianic zeal to tame President Saddam’s Iraq left untended both Afghanistan and more significantly Asia Pacific security. China made full use of the decade ending 2010 for its exponential military power expansion and with emphasis on a well-calibrated buildup of Chinese naval power for ‘naval operations in distant seas’. China’s latest strategic-economic enterprises of **O**ne **B**elt **O**ne **R**oad and Maritime **Silk Route** are nothing but an attempt to control **maritime chokepoints** along the global commons to **U**nited **S**tates disadvantage and as strategic pressure points against regional **peer competitors**.

**Uniqueness**

**UQ – Material**

**US military spending in Taiwan is increasing**

**Wong and Schmitt 5/24/2022**

[Edward, diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times who reports on foreign policy from Washington, D.C, and Eric, senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times, “U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China”, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-military.html]

WASHINGTON — The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say. Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe. U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries. The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack. Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops. American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say. Washington increasingly uses the presence of its military and those of allies as deterrence. The Pentagon has begun divulging more details about the sailings of American warships through the Taiwan Strait — 30 since the start of 2020. And U.S. officials praise partner nations like Australia, Britain, Canada and France when their warships transit through the strait.

**UQ – Focus**

**Biden is shifting focus back to Asia**

**Solís 5/24/2022**

[Mireya, Director - Center for East Asia Policy Studies Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Will Biden’s Asia trip help the US meet its strategic objectives?”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/24/will-bidens-asia-trip-help-the-u-s-meet-its-strategic-objectives/]

U.S. President Joe Biden’s inaugural trip to Asia provides an important milestone to assess the **direction and effectiveness of American policy** in the Indo-Pacific — a region identified by Republican and Democratic administrations alike as holding a key to American prosperity and security. The Asia tour came on the heels of the president hosting Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders in Washington and comprised stops in Seoul and Tokyo for bilateral meetings and participation in the second Quad leaders’ meeting. This full-court diplomatic engagement was crucial, given the importance of the objectives at stake: buttressing the rules-based order across Eurasia; deepening strategic relations with and between the United States’ Asian allies; and launching the economic track of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Mission critical for the presidential visit was to **reassure the region that the United States will remain committed** to its Indo-Pacific tilt, even **as it weathers** the worst crisis Europe has suffered in seven decades in the wake of Russia’s invasion of **Ukraine**. In visiting two Asian democratic allies — Japan and South Korea — that have proactively partaken in the economic sanctions campaign to deter and punish Russian aggression, the Biden administration has sent an eloquent message about the indivisibility of the rules-based order. In other words, unchecked military aggression and economic coercion weaken peace and stability everywhere, and the United States is uniquely placed to mobilize allies across Europe and Asia to meet the challenge. BILATERALS AND MINILATERALS Biden’s trip was timely as both South Korea and Japan are each expanding their strategic horizons in ways that complement U.S. interests in the region. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, only 11 days in office when he hosted Biden, has vowed to move from the narrower focus of the previous Moon administration on inter-Korean relations to embrace a broader regional and global role for South Korea in technology and supply chains, climate, and health security, and other fields. Yoon’s more skeptical view of China is behind his desire to step up cooperation with the Quad and to coordinate with the United States on economic security measures (investment screening and export controls, among others). Hence, the joint leaders’ announcement highlighted the promise of a comprehensive strategic alliance that leverages the U.S.-South Koreapartnership beyond the Korean Peninsula.

**A2 Ukraine**

**Biden remains focused on Asia despite Ukraine**

**Galic et al 6/9/2022**

[Mirna Galic, Senior Policy Analyst, China and Ease Asia, Brian Harding, Senior Expert, Southeast Asia, Tamanna Salikuddin, Director, Southeast Asia Programs, and Vikram J. Singh, Senior Advisor, Asia Center, “Amid Ukraine War, U.S. Signals the Indo-Pacific is a Vital Priority”, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/amid-ukraine-war-us-signals-indo-pacific-vital-priority]

While the Ukraine war continues to dominate policymakers’ attention, the Biden administration has engaged in a series of diplomatic initiatives with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific region over the course of the last two months. The message is clear: Washington sees the Indo-Pacific as the world’s **principal geostrategic region**, with a host of challenges to meet — like competition with China and climate change — and opportunities to seize, particularly related to technology and the economy. USIP’s Mirna Galic, Brian Harding, Tamanna Salikuddin and Vikram Singh analyze Washington’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy, U.S.-India relations amid differences over the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s engagement in the Pacific Islands region and the role of economics in the administration’s regional strategy. In the last two months alone, the Biden administration has held ministerial talks with India and a summit of ASEAN leaders in Washington, and President Biden went to South Korea and Japan and participated in a summit of "Quad" leaders, among other high-level meetings. What is the administration seeking to accomplish through these talks and meetings, and how is it balancing this focus on Asia with the ongoing conflict in eastern Europe? Galic: The president’s visit to the region and the recent regional diplomacy both there and in Washington are all in support of the administration’s desire to **reorient U.S. foreign policy** to the reality that the Indo-Pacific is the **emerging center of gravity** of the international system. Not only is it home to a great power competitor, China, which the administration sees as the “most serious, long-term” challenger to the international order, but it is also expected to be the driver of global economic and technological growth in the decades to come. The war in Ukraine has hampered the administration’s desire to focus full throttle on the Indo-Pacific region, but it has also reaffirmed the importance of the region beyond its borders. This was demonstrated not only by Chinese support for Russia, but also by the assistance of regional partners like Australia, Japan and South Korea, among others, in the imposition of punishing sanctions on Russia and the provision of support to Ukraine. It is precisely a focus on these and other partners in the region that forms the core of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and its efforts to “more firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific.” Perhaps more remarkably than that **the United States remains focused on the Indo-Pacific even with the danger posed by Russia**, is that Europe too is not far behind, despite bearing the brunt of the current conflict. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the NATO Summit in Madrid later this month, where the alliance will reveal its new Strategic Concept, which is expected to address China in addition to Russia.

**Link**

**General – Security Coop**

**Doubling down on European defense trades off with deterring China**

**Wertheim 3/3/2022**

[Stephen, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/]

Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should **resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe**, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in **Beijing**, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be **unwise and** likely **impossible**. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far **greater magnitude**, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. **If the United States doubles down** on European security while leading the charge in Asia, **it may either fall short in both** places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

**AI**

**AI interoperability is expensive and time-consuming**

**Nurkin and Konaev 5/25/2022**

[Tate, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Margarita, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/]

AI is essential to this effort, and the DoD is exploring how best to safely integrate it into the JADC2 program.48 In December 2021, reports emerged that the JADC2 cross-functional team (CTF) would start up an “AI for C2” working group, which will examine how to leverage responsible AI to enhance and accelerate command and control, reinforcing the centrality of responsible AI to the project.49 In March 2022, the DoD released an unclassified version of its JADC2 Implementation Plan, a move that represented, in the words of General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “irreversible momentum toward implementing” JADC2.50 However, observers have highlighted several **persistent challenges** to implementing JADC2 along the urgent timelines required to maintain (or regain) advantage in perception, processing, and cognition, especially vis-à-vis China. Data security and cybersecurity, data-governance and sharing issues, interoperability with allies, and issues associated with integrating the service’s networks have all been cited as challenges with recognizing the ambitious promise of JADC2’s approach. Some have also highlighted that all- encompassing ambition as a challenge as well. The Hudson Institute’s Bryan Clark and Dan Patt argue that “the urgency of today’s threats and the opportunities emerging from new technologies demand that Pentagon leaders flip JADC2’s focus from what the US military services want to what warfighters need.”51 To be sure, grand ambition is not necessarily something to be avoided in AI development and integration programs. However, pathways to adoption will need to balance **difficult-to-achieve, bureaucratically entrenched, time-consuming, and expensive objectives** with developing systems that can deliver capability and advantage along the more immediate threat timelines facing US forces.

**Massive funding is key**

**Christie 2022**

[Edward Hunter, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe”, European View

2022, Vol. 21(1) 13–21]

Much has already been achieved in terms of new structures, new initiatives and new policy developments to support the collaborative adoption of AI among NATO Allies and EU member states. In addition to pre-existing structures and mechanisms at both the NATO and EU levels, which have ensured that nations are not starting from scratch, national defence institutions are already able to refer to common policy commitments and to options, whether through NATO or the EDA, for research or capability-development activities. At the same time, ensuring a competitive edge in AI is a truly **whole-of-government effort** which requires considerable cross-over between the military and civilian realms. **Large gaps remain** between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. At the same time, the gaps pertaining to research are far smaller. To ensure greater European performance and relevance in AI in general, and its defence applications in particular, it seems desirable to focus on two strategic priorities**: investment volumes**, both public and private, which **need to be significantly increased**; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US.

**Cyber**

**NATO cybersecurity programs are expensive**

**Sanger 2016**,

[David, White House and national security correspondent, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy”, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/nato-russia-cyberwarfare.html]

It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously **difficult and expensive to defend against**, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks. “The biggest problem in cyber remains deterrence,” said Mr. Ilves, the Estonian president, who has made the issue of avoiding cyber conflict one of the main themes of his time in office. “We have been talking about the need to deal with it within NATO for years now.”

**Infrastructure hardening is a massive investment**

**Wolff 3/2/2022**

[Josephine, associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, “Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine”, https://time.com/6153902/russia-major-cyber-attacks-invasion-ukraine/]

It’s likely that the combined efforts of Microsoft, the U.S., and many other countries and companies to ramp up cyber defenses both in and outside of Ukraine has undoubtedly helped curb the damage caused by these efforts. But if Russia really had on hand a stockpile of previously undetected vulnerabilities and sophisticated malware designed to exploit them, these lines of defense simply would not be enough to prevent some significant damage and disruption. Updating critical infrastructure networks and systems is **slow, expensive, complicated** work and it’s impossible that every potential target has been hardened to the point where it is no longer vulnerable to Russian cyberattacks—unless those cyberattacks were never all that impressive to begin with.

**Yes Zero Sum**

**DOD spending inevitably causes tradeoffs**

**Rue 2013**

[W. Jonathan, senior policy analyst at a small consulting firm where he specializes in defense policy and budget issues. A former Marine captain, he served in Iraq as an intelligence advisor, “FORCE MODERNIZATION AND READINESS: A ZERO SUM GAME?”, https://warontherocks.com/2013/07/force-modernization-and-readiness-a-zero-sum-game/]

Having made the decision not to size the military for large-scale, protracted ground combat, policymakers are attempting to prioritize modernization and readiness at the expense of personnel. There are, however, worrying signs that readiness is being sacrificed, and that budgetary pressure will result in the very thing we wish to avoid: a hollow military, which will make it impossible to project real power. There is an inherent tension between three pillars of defense spending: personnel, modernization and readiness. **Finite resources make it impossible to avoid tradeoffs** among the three. Thus, planners must balance between the competing needs of each. By reducing Army and Marine ground forces by 108,000, policymakers have decided not to size the force for long-term, protracted ground combat operations. Not only do policymakers appear to have lost their appetite for such campaigns, planners have justified the decision with the not unreasonable assertion that raising manpower will be easier and faster than, say, designing and building an aircraft carrier, tank or fighter. Moreover, a decade of combat operations has left the force with used and abused equipment that badly needs refitting and replacing. But even as the Department reduces active duty end strength, personnel costs continue to rise. Personnel costs mostly appear in two different accounts within DoD’s budget: personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M). The personnel account is basically military compensation and consists of active duty pay and other cash benefits such as housing and food allowances, special pay and bonuses. O&M includes the many non-cash benefits like healthcare, childcare services, subsidized food and clothing (commissaries and exchanges), and fitness and recreation. Then, there are the deferred benefits for pensions and healthcare for retirees. For 2013, DoD requested $346 billion for operations and support (O&S), which is simply the sum of personnel and O&M. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that despite end strength reductions of five percent, O&S costs will rise to $373 billion in 2017. Since 2001, personnel costs in the base budget have increased by nearly 90 percent or about 30 percent above inflation, while the number of military personnel has increased by only about three percent. Additionally, the O&M costs per service member increased from $55,000 to $105,000 between 1980 and 2001. The CBO projects it will be $161,000 in 2016. The main drivers of this cost growth are military compensation and health care. Military healthcare costs rose over 170 percent from 2001-2012, from $19 billion to $53 billion. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that if DoD spending continues to rise at roughly the rate of inflation, personnel costs will consume the entire DoD budget by 2039. These costs are crowding out the ability to invest in modernization and readiness of the force, hollowing the budget from within and weakening the defense dollar. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) projects that even though the defense topline in 2021 will be $100 billion larger than previous drawdowns, it will only buy an active force that is 34 percent smaller than the force in 1978. CSIS also estimates that in order to maintain the traditional budget figure of 32 percent for modernization, an additional 455,000 active duty troops will need to be cut. The nature of sequestration in the early years prioritizes modernization over readiness. Major acquisition programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, littoral combat ship, Virginia-class submarine, the SSBN(X) and other programs take their ten percent lumps, but such cuts are minor hiccups for these multi-year programs. After all, what difference does one less F-35 mean in 2012? On the other hand, a ten percent cut to the services’ operations accounts has immediate and real impacts. The Air Force is cutting 44,000 flying hours and grounding C-17 squadrons and the Navy is delaying critical refueling and maintenance for the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. Army brigades will fail to meet readiness standards for deployment. **Modernization and readiness appear to be locked in a zero sum game**. What good is maximum readiness if the force is using broken and obsolete equipment? Conversely, how will the force use the next generation of weapons to their maximum potential if there’s not enough money to train with them? In order to relieve some of the downward pressure on both, personnel must enter the equation; however, reducing end strength will only work up to a certain point. Policymakers must confront the rising costs of the All Volunteer Force if they’re to have a military capable of answering their frequent phone calls.

**A2 Aff Isn’t DOD**

**SC requires DOD – Congress proves**

**Quinn 2019**

[Major Jason A., Judge Advocate, United States Army, “Other Security Forces Too:

Traditional Combatant Commander Activities Between U.S. Special Operations Forces and Foreign Non-Military Forces”, https://tjaglcs.army.mil/other-security-forces-too-traditional-combatant-commander-activities-between-u.s.-special-operations-forces-and-foreign-non-military-forces]

Under this definition, “security sector assistance” includes the relevant policies, programs, or activities of any executive agency. Complicating matters, though, Congress has considered a proposed definition for “security sector assistance” that, in contrast to the presidential policy definition, 130 encompasses DoS programs, but not DoD or other executive agency programs. 131 In addition, Congress has defined “security cooperation” as DoD specific, 132 but it has not defined “security assistance.” The DoD adheres to the presidential policy definition and further defines “security cooperation” as all its relationship building and foreign partner development activities, including “security assistance,” which the DoD defines as a subset of security cooperation that is funded and authorized by the DoS and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 133 The DoS, on the other hand, uses the term “security assistance” in a manner that contradicts the DoD’s definition, employing it to describe any DoS or DoD assistance to foreign military or other security forces. 134

**A2 Normal Means = New Money**

**The link isn’t just about money – focus is perceived by China**

**DOD financing is complicated – new demands *during the fiscal* year ensure tradeoffs**

\*plan is a new program added off-budget

AIA = Army International Activities

HQDA = Headquarters Department of the Army

**Szayna et al 2004**

[Thomas S. Szayna, Adam Grissom, Jefferson P. Marquis, Thomas-Durell Young, Brian Rosen, Yuna Huh, RAND, “U.S. Army Security Cooperation Toward Improved Planning and Management, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA426628.pdf]

A review of the resourcing processes and trends in recent (since fiscal year 1995) Army expenditures on AIA shows that the Army's budgeting system is not well structured to account for basic AIA expenditures. We were able to arrive at an aggregate level of the direct Army costs associated with AIA for the period 1995-2001 (and make estimates until 2005). Since 1995, the direct costs have fluctuated largely in the $400-$5 00 million range annually. The AIA resource management problem is compounded by the lack of both a definitive list of activities and a mechanism that links unofficial AIA categories with official Army and DoD resourcing categories. In addition, the Army is not properly accounting for many personnel costs related to security cooperation and, in some cases, is missing an opportunity to increase the amount of administrative costs charged directly to the customer. As a result of the disjointed nature of AIA programming and budgeting, HQDA is currently incapable of capturing the many hidden costs associated with AIA. The situation precludes HQDA from making **fully informed policy and resource decisions with regard to security cooperation programs**. In an overall sense, the existing security cooperation planning process is exceedingly complex, involving a multitude of actors, problematic incentive systems, incomplete information exchange, and no reliable measures of effectiveness. Virtually all of the stakeholders understand only certain aspects of the process and/or have only partial visibility into the process. The drivers and demanders of AIA tend to have an incomplete understanding of the **resourcing problems and the tradeoffs involved** in making AIA choices. In turn, HQDA (the supplier of AIA resources) has an incomplete understanding of the benefits of AIA, and the Army's own resourcing tools are not easily amenable to an in-depth understanding of the resources it commits to AIA. Fundamentally, demand for AIA is predicated upon the amount of AIA supply provided by the Department of the Army, as opposed to the latter being the product of policy, strategy, and resource guidance. Indeed, incrementalism and continuity, rather than policy and strategy, have been the principal driving agents in the development of AIA resource priorities

**Impact**

**2NC DA Outweighs**

**China is a bigger threat than Russia, and the aff distracts focus**

\*Ukraine is temporary, not a shift in strategy

**AP 5/26/2022**

[“Blinken says China is greater long-term threat than Russia”, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blinken-says-china-is-greater-long-term-threat-than-russia/]

While the U.S. sees Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine as the most acute and immediate threat to international stability, Blinken said the administration believes **China poses a greater danger**. "Even as President Putin's war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order – and that is the one posed by the People's Republic of China," Blinken said. "China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order — and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it," he said. "Beijing's vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world's progress over the past 75 years." The secretary of state laid out principles for the administration to marshal its resources, friends and allies to push back on increasing Chinese assertiveness around the world. But he made it clear that the U.S. doesn't seek to change China's political system, just offer a tested alternative. "This is not about forcing countries to choose, it's about giving them a choice," he said. However, he also acknowledged that the U.S. has limited ability to directly influence China's intentions and ambitions and will instead focus on shaping the strategic environment around China. "We can't rely on Beijing to change its trajectory," Blinken said in the speech at George Washington University. "So we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open and inclusive international system." And Blinken acknowledged that the fates of U.S. and China "are linked," and the two countries will need to work together on a number of global issues now and in the future, and "that's why this is one of the most complex and consequential relationships of any that we have in the world today." The speech followed President Joe Biden's visits to South Korea and Japan, concluded just this week, where China loomed large in discussions. During the trip, he made the surprising remark that the United States would act militarily to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of an invasion by China, which regards the island as a renegade province. The administration was quick to insist Mr. Biden was not changing American policy, and Blinken on Thursday restated that the U.S. has not changed its position. Washington, he said, still holds to its "One China" policy, which recognizes Beijing but allows for unofficial links with and arms sales to Taipei. Blinken argued that the global response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine is a template for confronting China's efforts to mold a new and unpredictable world order to replace the rules and institutions that have guided relations between states since the end of World War II. China, Blinken suggested, has benefited greatly from that international order but is now trying to subvert it under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party. "Rather than using its power to reinforce and revitalize the laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that enabled its success, so other countries can benefit from them, too, Beijing is undermining it," Blinken said. "Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad." Investment in domestic U.S. infrastructure and technology along with stepping up diplomatic outreach to potentially vulnerable countries are other elements of the policy are key to the U.S. approach, Blinken said. In the latest manifestation of China's push to expand its reach that has drawn concern from the U.S. and other democracies, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Thursday began an eight-nation tour of Pacific islands during which Beijing hopes to strike a sweeping agreement that covers everything from security to fisheries. Wang opened his tour in the Solomon Islands, which last month signed a security cooperation pact with China that some fear could lead to a Chinese military presence there. The agreement was finalized shortly after the Biden administration announced it would open a U.S. embassy in the Solomons as part of its efforts to engage in the greater Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration has largely kept in place confrontational policies toward China adopted by its predecessor in response to Chinese actions in its western Xinjiang region, Hong Kong, Tibet and the South China Sea.

**2NC Yes China War**

**Even limited Chinese expansion spreads authoritarianism and triggers great power war**

**Brands 2020**

[Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”, Foreign Policy, 4/20/20, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world>]

What a difference two decades make. In the early years of this century, the world appeared to be moving toward a single, seamless order under U.S. leadership. **Today the world is fragmenting, and authoritarian challengers, led by China and Russia, are chipping away at American influence in East Asia, eastern Europe, and the Middle East**. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush administration envisioned the end of great-power rivalries. **In 2020, the question is how great powers can navigate their rivalries without stumbling into war**. Writing in Foreign Affairs (“The New Spheres of Influence,” March/April 2020), Graham Allison offers a road map for this new environment: the United States should accept the return of “spheres of influence” and effectively let China and Russia dominate swaths of their respective geopolitical neighborhoods. Doing so, Allison contends, is actually in keeping with the United States’ best diplomatic traditions, considering that Washington tolerated a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe during the Cold War. Reviving that tradition is necessary, simply because the United States no longer has the military and economic dominance to deny China and Russia their geopolitical due. And it is desirable, because mutually accepted spheres of influence can promote stability and peace in a more rivalrous world. Allison’s argument is alluring but wrong. In truth, the United States has resisted the creation of rival spheres of influence for most of its history, even as it has worked assiduously to build its own. **Ceding ground to China and Russia today would be not a recipe for stability but a blueprint for coercion and conflict, and it would weaken the United States’ geopolitical hand vis-à-vis its rivals**. **Nor is a return to spheres of influence foreordained—Washington still has the power to prevent Beijing and Moscow from dominating their regions, so long as it rejects Allison’s advice to cut loose its vulnerable frontline allies**. A tougher, more competitive world is unavoidable. **A far more dangerous world, divided into competing superpower fiefdoms, is not**. AN AMERICAN TRADITION Spheres of influence have been common throughout history, but Americans have never been quite comfortable with them. In fact, much of U.S. foreign policy dating back to independence has consisted of efforts to prevent rival powers from establishing such domains. In the nineteenth century, U.S. leaders rejected the idea that any European power should have a sphere of influence in North America or the Western Hemisphere at large. They maneuvered—often quite ruthlessly—to evict European powers from these areas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States took this regional policy global. The so-called Open Door policy aimed to dissuade foreign powers from carving up China, and later all of East Asia, into exclusive spheres. Washington joined World War I in part to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant European power. A generation later, the United States fought to deny Japan a sphere of influence in the Pacific and prevent Hitler from establishing primacy over the entire Old World. During and after World War II, Washington also engaged in quieter diplomatic and economic efforts to accelerate the dissolution of the British Empire. Even during the Cold War, Americans never fully accepted Soviet control over eastern Europe. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to roll back the Iron Curtain through ideological warfare and covert action; later administrations expanded trade and diplomatic ties with Warsaw Pact states as a subtler way of undermining Kremlin control. The Reagan administration overtly and covertly supported political movements that were challenging the Kremlin’s authority from within. And when Washington had a chance to peacefully destroy the Soviet sphere of influence after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it did, supporting German unification and the expansion of NATO. **Opposition to spheres of influence, in other words, is a part of U.S. diplomatic DNA**. The reason for this, Charles Edel and I argued in 2018, is that spheres of influence clash with fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. Among them is the United States’ approach to security, which holds that safeguarding the country’s vital interests and physical well-being requires preventing rival powers from establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere or dominating strategically important regions overseas. Likewise, **the United States’ emphasis on promoting liberty and free trade translates to a concern that spheres of influence—particularly those dominated by authoritarian powers—would impede the spread of U.S. values and allow hostile powers to block American trade and investment**. Finally, spheres of influence do not mesh well with American exceptionalism—the notion that the United States should transcend the old, corrupt ways of balance-of-power diplomacy and establish a more humane, democratic system of international relations. Of course, that intellectual tradition did not stop the United States from building its own sphere of influence in Latin America from the early nineteenth century onward, nor did it prevent it from drawing large chunks of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East into a global sphere of influence after World War II. Yet the same tradition has led the United States to run its sphere of influence far more progressively than past great powers, which is why far more countries have sought to join that sphere than to leave it. And since **hypocrisy is another venerable tradition in global affairs**, it is not surprising that Americans would establish their own, relatively enlightened sphere of influence while denying the legitimacy of everyone else’s. That endeavor reached its zenith in the post–Cold War era, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc made it possible to envision a world in which **Washington’s sphere of influence—also known as the liberal international order—was the only game in town**. **The United States maintained a world-beating military that could intervene around the globe; preserved and expanded a global alliance structure as a check on aggression; and sought to integrate potential challengers, namely Beijing and Moscow, into a U.S.-led system**. It was a remarkably ambitious project, as Allison rightly notes, but it was the culmination of, rather than a departure from, a diplomatic tradition reaching back two centuries. GIVE THEM AN INCH… The post–Cold War moment is over, and the prospect of a divided world has returned. Russia is projecting power in the Middle East and staking a claim to dominance in its “near abroad.” China is seeking primacy in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia and using its diplomatic and economic influence to draw countries around the world more tightly into its orbit. Both have developed the tools needed to coerce their neighbors and keep U.S. forces at bay. Allison is one of several analysts who have recently advanced the argument that the United States should make a virtue of necessity—that it should accept Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, encompassing some portion of eastern Europe and the western Pacific, as the price of stability and peace. The logic is twofold: first, to create a cleaner separation between contending parties by clearly marking where one’s influence ends and the other’s begins; and second, to reduce the chances of conflict by giving rising or resurgent powers a safe zone along their borders. In theory, this seems like a reasonable way of preventing competition from turning into outright conflict, especially given that countries such as Taiwan and the Baltic states lie thousands of miles from the United States but on the doorsteps of its rivals. Yet in reality, a spheres-of-influence world would bring more peril than safety. **Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence would inevitably be domains of coercion and authoritarianism**. Both countries are run by illiberal, autocratic regimes; their leaders see democratic values as profoundly threatening to their political survival. **If Moscow and Beijing dominated their respective neighborhoods, they would naturally seek to undermine democratic governments that resist their control—as China is already doing in Taiwan and as Russia is doing in Ukraine—or that challenge, through their very existence, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule**. **The practical consequence of acceding to authoritarian spheres of influence would be to intensify the crisis of democracy** that afflicts the world today. **The United States would suffer economically**, too. China, in particular, is a mercantilist power already working to turn Asian economies toward Beijing and could one day put the United States at a severe disadvantage on the world’s most economically dynamic continent. Washington should not concede a Chinese sphere of influence unless it is also willing to compromise the “Open Door” principles that have animated its statecraft for over a century. Such costs might be acceptable in exchange for peace and security. But spheres of influence during the Cold War did not prevent the Soviets from repeatedly testing American redlines in Berlin, causing high-stakes crises in which nuclear war was a real possibility. Nor did those spheres prevent the two sides from competing sharply, and sometimes violently, throughout the “Third World.” Throughout history, spheres-of-influence settlements, from the Thirty Years’ Peace between Athens and Sparta to the Peace of Amiens between the United Kingdom and Napoleonic France have often ended, sooner or later, in war. **The idea that spheres of influence are a formula for peace rests on assumptions that often go unexamined: that revisionist powers are driven primarily by insecurity, that their grievances are limited and can be easily satisfied, that the truly vital interests of competing powers do not conflict, and that creative statecraft can therefore fashion an enduring, mutually acceptable equilibrium**. The trouble is that these premises don’t always hold. **Ideology and the quest for greatness—not simply insecurity—often drive great powers**. **Rising states are continually tempted to renegotiate previous bargains once they have the power to do so**. **Offering concessions to a revisionist state may simply convince it that the existing order is fragile and can be tested further**. **Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply give that challenger a better position from which to realize its ambitions**. Consider the situation in the western Pacific. The most minimal Chinese sphere of influence would surely include Taiwan. Yet if Taiwan became a platform for Chinese military capabilities, the defense of other U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines, would become vastly more difficult. **Nor would such a concession likely satisfy Chinese ambitions**. A growing body of literature by scholars such as Toshi Yoshihara, James Holmes, Liza Tobin, and Elizabeth Economy suggests that **China desires at the very least to push the United States beyond the chain of islands running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Even a limited Chinese sphere in the western Pacific would serve as a springboard to this larger objective**. Meanwhile, **the United States will have sacrificed a number of critical advantages by pulling out**. A free Taiwan offers proof that Chinese culture and democracy are not incompatible; subjugating Taiwan would also allow Beijing to remove this ideological threat. Worse still, the United States would lose the edge that comes from being the only great power without significant security hazards near its borders. It was only after the United States achieved dominance in the Western Hemisphere that it could project power globally. **Russia and China, by contrast, still have to deal with U.S. allies, partners, and military presences in their own backyards—a circumstance that diverts resources they might otherwise use to pursue more distant ambitions and compete with the United States at a truly global scale**. MEASURES OF POWER Fortunately, **new spheres of influence are avoidable**. **Russia is a formidable player because of its willingness to take risks and pursue asymmetric strategies; but Moscow will not rebuild a meaningful sphere of influence so long as the United States opposes that ambition**. In Europe, Russia is still dramatically outmatched. Admittedly, on NATO’s eastern flank, geography and the local balance of power favor Moscow; but even there, the alliance has been strengthening its capabilities for several years. Studies by the RAND Corporation show that with the right troop deployments, NATO could establish a credible—and affordable—deterrent to Russian aggression without posing any offensive threat. Russia, meanwhile, has struggled even to pull Ukraine back into its orbit: although Russian-backed separatists are waging a bloody war in the eastern part of the country, and Moscow has annexed Crimea, western Ukraine has gravitated toward Europe and the United States since 2014. And although Russia can wield some influence in the Middle East, it can emerge as the region’s primary outside power only if the United States abandons its role there. The extent of China’s power makes the situation in the western Pacific more difficult. Yet **Beijing will have trouble dominating the region in the same way that the United States came to dominate the Caribbean**. **China’s neighbors are not pushovers**. Many have the diplomatic and military support of the United States, and some, such as Japan, are major powers in their own right. What is more, China must project military power across large bodies of water if it is to establish authority in the region, and to do so is inherently difficult. It will be all the more difficult if U.S. regional allies invest in the capabilities needed to inflict high costs on any assault and if Washington refines its capabilities and concepts for countering Chinese aggression. The regional military balance will not ever revert to what it was in 1996, when Washington could face down Beijing’s attempts to intimidate Taiwan by sailing two carrier strike groups into the waters off China’s coast; but with the right investments and strategies, the United States and its allies can lengthen the odds of Chinese regional dominance. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, China is also using information operations, economic blandishments, and other forms of political meddling to weaken the region’s resistance to its power. Yet some countries are already working to reduce their vulnerability to economic and political coercion. Australia has undertaken a major campaign to highlight malign Chinese influence; Japan is actively seeking to limit its dependence on supply chains that run through China. Washington may have done more by itself than China has done to undermine U.S. economic power in the region, through its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement and its tardiness in developing alternatives, together with its allies, to Chinese technology, investment, and lending. These policy errors are damaging, but they are still within the United States’ power to correct. DON'T GIVE UP YET The prospects for maintaining favorable regional balances of power are far better than the skeptics assume. **What is essential, however, is that Washington not erode those balances by severing ties with vulnerable allies and partners on the frontlines**. Allison suggests that doing so might be necessary to bring U.S. capabilities in line with commitments and reduce friction with rising powers. Yet the effect of abandoning the Baltic allies or breaking the ambiguous commitment to Taiwan would be to make it impossible for those countries to ward off Chinese or Russian influence and to demoralize other U.S. allies around them. Washington would be paving the way for just the authoritarian spheres of influence it should—and can—avoid. The United States has a distinguished record of breaking down authoritarian spheres of influence, first in its own hemisphere and then beyond. **It should not now make the historic blunder of throwing that achievement away for an illusory promise of stability or as a premature concession to a darker future that need not come to pass**.

**2NC Containment Works**

**China can be contained – deterrence theory**

**Brands 2020**

[Hal, Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “If America and China Go to War, It Won’t Be an Accident,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-07/war-between-china-and-america-won-t-happen-by-accident]

This isn’t the same thing as saying that a Chinese-American war won't happen. Conflict tends to occur when one party decides that war, or actions risking war, is preferable to living with the status quo or backing down in a crisis. That could happen all too easily. If China concludes that Taiwan is distancing itself too far from the mainland politically, as the balance of power shifts in Beijing's favor militarily, then it might decide that war is better than letting the dream of reunification slip away. If Chinese leaders worry that their domestic legitimacy is slipping, they might behave more belligerently in a crisis, for fear that war is less dangerous than humiliation. Beijing might even gamble that the U.S. would stay out of a short, sharp war with Japan over the Senkaku Islands or the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and that gamble might not pay off. But in any of these cases, Beijing would be making a **deliberate choice** to seek key objectives through the use of coercion or force, with the knowledge that a larger conflict is a real possibility. If a U.S.-China war results from such a choice, it could hardly be called an accident. Why does this matter? Because it bears on the best way of avoiding war in the Pacific. Establishing memorandums of understanding on how military forces operating in close proximity should conduct themselves, creating mechanisms for communication in a crisis, and other steps to encourage de-escalation is helpful. What is critical, however, is maintaining the military balance of power, and the **perception of U.S. commitment**, that makes it **less likely** that **Chinese leaders** could **imagine a war** in the region **going their way**. That is a huge and urgent task. It involves not just spending money but devising operational concepts and new capabilities, such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, that make it prohibitively difficult for China to project power. It requires **strengthening U.S. alliances** that have atrophied or been damaged during the administration of President Donald Trump. That agenda may seem daunting, given how badly the situation in the Western Pacific has eroded. Yet Americans shouldn't fool themselves into thinking that just managing crises and mitigating misperception — as important as those objectives are — offer a cheaper way to preserve the peace.

**Empirics prove US strength causes China to back down**

**Stashwick 2020**

[Steven, independent writer and researcher based in New York City focused on East Asian security and maritime issues, "Chinese Military Told to Prevent Escalation in Interactions With US," The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinese-military-told-to-prevent-escalation-in-interactions-with-us/]

China’s military has reportedly been instructed to **deescalate incidents** with **the U.S. military** to **prevent potential undesired clashes** as tensions rise between the two countries in the Western Pacific. The South China Morning Post [quotes](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3096978/south-china-sea-chinese-military-told-not-fire-first-shot) **Chinese sources** claiming that pilots and ship captains have been **told “not to fire the first shot**” in potential incidents with U.S. ships or planes. **The reported order follows several months of increased U.S. naval and air operations** in and around the **S**outh **C**hina **S**ea and **years** of **dangerous and provocative** responses by **Chinese** ships and planes. The United States conducted prolonged “[dual carrier operations](https://news.usni.org/2020/07/17/two-u-s-carriers-return-to-south-china-sea-after-state-dept-formally-rejects-chinese-claims)” in the South China Sea and Western Pacific this summer and for a period **three carriers were operating in the region** simultaneously following increased Chinese military activity as the world reeled from the coronavirus pandemic in the spring. In June the United States appeared to **significantly increase the number of surveillance flights** according to private flight tracking services and Chinese think tanks. These apparently **private efforts by the Chinese military** to **prevent unintended escalation** with United States **contrast with China’s bombastic public narrative** about the U.S. Navy’s presence in the region.

**2NC China Revisionist**

**China is revisionist – unique actions and rhetoric prove**

**Roy 2019**

[Denny, Senior Fellow at the East–West Center, “Assertive China: Irredentism or Expansionism?”, Survival, Vol. 61, No. 1]

What is driving Chinese behaviour? **Beijing’s explanation of its own foreign policy draws a sharp distinction between China’s general external orientation and the specific case of territorial-sovereignty issues**. **According to the Communist Party, China is fundamentally a peace-loving, defence-oriented, non-expansionist country that is harmless in most situations**. Since the early 1990s, Chinese officials, media and scholars have consistently made the case for Chinese exceptionalism: that for cultural and historical reasons, China is a ‘principled’ country that eschews the usual great-power avarice, and therefore the world need not fear that a strong China will bully weaker countries. In Xi’s own words, ‘No matter how strong its economy grows, China will never seek hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence.’8 This has become a mantra from Xi and other senior Chinese leaders. A similar formulation – one that has often been repeated by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang – is ‘we will not take or occupy an inch of others’ land’.9 **At the same time, however, China is uncompromising and resolute to the point of being willing to use military force when it comes to asserting Chinese control over territory the country claims for its own**. In one of many speeches in which he recommitted to opposing ‘acts and tricks to separate the country’, Xi warned that ‘The Chinese people … have the spirit of fighting the bloody battle against our enemies to the bitter end.’10 **The recovery of lost national territory has been a major theme of modern Chinese history, and the Communist Party has staked its own legitimacy on how successfully it accomplishes this goal**. Since the 1980s, the regime has strongly promoted the notion of China as a victim of foreign predation prior to Mao Zedong’s establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 in order to mobilise public support for the government and its policies.11 **Party officials place ‘lost’ territory in the context of what they call the ‘Century of Humiliation’ by emphasising that foreigners invaded these areas during times when China was too weak to defend itself**. Accordingly, **the Communist Party is obligated to distinguish itself from unworthy governments of the past by re-establishing Beijing’s control over Chinese-claimed territories**. In recent years, **Beijing has introduced the idea that China’s ‘rejuvenation’ cannot occur without the recovery of lost Chinese territory**.12 This principle is most often applied to Taiwan. The political unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland has long been deemed a ‘core interest’ of the party, a designation that signals its highest level of commitment – and a willingness to go to war if necessary. Thus, a Chinese diplomat posted to the Chinese embassy in Washington DC responded to the suggestion that US ships might visit Taiwan by saying, ‘The day that a U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force.’13 Compared with the Taiwan issue, Beijing’s commitment to securing uncontested ownership of uninhabited maritime territories in the East and South China seas, or the Indian-occupied region of Arunachal Pradesh, is less insistent.14 Nevertheless, Chinese behaviour over the past couple of decades suggests Beijing intends to solidify rather than bargain away its claim over most of the South China Sea.15 **The trend is toward China’s hardening of even its non-core claims**. Focusing on irredentism as the driver of the foreign policies most worrisome to China’s neighbours allows the communist regime to claim that its pugnacious and uncooperative posture in its near abroad is not typical of how great-power China will conduct its foreign relations. This approach is well suited to Beijing’s purposes: it conveys to China’s neighbours that they cannot prevail in any territorial disputes with China, but that otherwise they have nothing to fear. As Xi put it in June 2018, ‘We cannot lose even one inch of the territory left behind by our ancestors. What is other people’s, we do not want at all.’16 The expansionist explanation An alternative explanation for assertive Chinese behaviour on the country’s periphery – one that Beijing explicitly denies – is that China is growing more expansionist as its relative power increases. **It is demanding more because it can**. Typical great powers strive to establish a sphere of influence, regardless of whether they have grounds for irredentist claims. They are usually dissatisfied if their influence over the international system falls short of their perceived relative power.17 Seen in this way, **assertive Chinese behaviour is not necessarily limited to the special case of disputed territory**. This raises the possibility that China’s determination to prevail in these disputes, through the use of military force if necessary, might also manifest itself in future Chinese strategic disagreements with regional countries that do not involve Chinese sovereignty claims. **The essential features of a sphere of influence are control and exclusivity: the dominant country enjoys privileges in a geographic region outside of its recognised borders that other states do not enjoy**. These privileges serve the dominant country’s economic or security interests, or both. The United States, for example, has tried to make itself the sole great power in its own hemisphere. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against further colonisation of the New World. The Roosevelt Corollary in 1904 asserted the right of the US government to resolve legitimate European complaints in Latin America, and afterward American forces frequently intervened in the hemisphere in support of US interests. During the first half of the twentieth century, an upstart Japan acquired an economic hinterland in eastern Asia, administered by colonial or puppet governments, to provide the Japanese home islands with resources and markets. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union sought to establish a political and military buffer zone in Eastern Europe. Moscow organised the Warsaw Pact in 1955 out of a fear of a resurgent West Germany allied with the United States and the other Western European countries. Determined to maintain satellite governments in the region, the Soviet government sent military forces to quell dissent against the ruling regimes in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, **Beijing demands exclusive control, mainly based on ownership rights, over areas on the Chinese periphery for both economic and security reasons**. The Chinese government insists that other states must not take resources from Chinese-claimed areas in the South China Sea. Hence the annual fishing ban, the expulsion of non-Chinese fishing boats and the harassment of survey ships making preparations to drill for hydrocarbons. Additionally, Beijing’s complaints about US military surveillance and the US Navy’s ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols make clear that the Chinese want to create a zone near China’s borders in which US military activity is constrained and subject to veto by Beijing. Much depends on whether outside observers accept China’s own characterisation of its foreign policy as having limited aims, or whether the country is perceived as having much broader goals. A policy motivated by irredentism has limited aims by definition, because the set of geographic areas over which China can make a reasonable claim of sovereignty is finite. A policy of expansionism, on the other hand, is potentially open-ended in its aspirations. **Beijing’s arguments have, in fact, established a foothold internationally**. Some analysts say China’s behaviour in its near abroad is reasonable and should not alarm foreign governments. Rob **Green** has argued that China ‘feels entitled to defend its interests in its own backyard, especially when history is on its side regarding the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas’. In particular, he describes China’s East China Sea ADIZ as a ‘long-delayed response, under severe provocation from the US and Japan, to the Japanese ADIZ’, adding that ‘The US, Russia, UK and France have had their own unilaterally declared zones for years.’18 Similarly, Richard **Turcsanyi** sees **Chinese ‘assertiveness’ in the South China Sea as a defensive reaction to acts by other governments**, such as the Philippines’ attempts to bolster its position on Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, and Washington’s announced policy of ‘pivoting’ or ‘rebalancing’ to Asia.19 Gavin **Choo** has argued that assertive Chinese behaviour is less threatening if the presumed motivation for it is irredentism. He says an understanding of the deep-seated Chinese sense of entitlement to regional leadership and historical grievance over the loss of this position leads to a ‘more benign interpretation of Beijing’s foreign policy’.20 Some observers contend that Chinese policies toward the disputed territories are not a harbinger of expansionism. ‘One should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large’, writes Alastair Iain **Johnston**.21 Likewise, Kyle **Haynes** asserts that: there is little indication that Chinese leaders harbor territorial ambitions beyond what was claimed in the immediate post-World War II period … The more aggressive pursuit of longstanding claims does not necessarily portend new, more expansive claims down the road.22 Although some critics accused him of being anti-China, Malcolm Turnbull said during his premiership of Australia that in the context of international security, ‘We do not describe China as a threat’ because ‘we do not see any hostile intent from China’.23 Mark **Valencia** characterises Chinese claims in the South China Sea not as a manifestation of China’s will to power, but rather as a product of nationalism combined with a sense of historical victimisation. ‘China has publicly positioned its sovereignty and claims in the South China Sea as a matter of national dignity and redemption for its “century of humiliation”’, he writes. Consequently, the Chinese government ‘need[s] to accommodate’ the demands of a nationalistic Chinese public ‘to maintain legitimacy’, making it ‘very difficult for China’s leadership to back down’. Valencia concludes that US challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are ‘ill-advised and even dangerous’.24 Similarly, Charles **Glaser** argues that China is willing to fight to take ‘disputed’ territory such as Taiwan and the South China Sea islands but not for the territory of US allies ‘when the status quo is crystal clear’, implying that the main driver of Chinese behaviour is irredentism and not a desire for a sphere of influence. Aside from the areas where China claims sovereignty, ‘there is actually little reason to believe that [China] has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond’, says Glaser.25 Doug **Bandow** argues the United States should avoid confronting China over Beijing’s South China Sea claims because ‘the existing territorial and juridical order was established at a time of Chinese isolation and weakness’. He claims that Chinese actions are motivated by national pride, and that acquiescence to Chinese claims would have insignificant negative strategic impact on US interests.26 Similarly, Erwin **Blaauw** sees no intrinsic Chinese aspiration to control its external strategic environment. ‘In the end,’ he writes, ‘the over-arching driving factor behind foreign policy in China, and the common denominator to most of China’s global activities, is China’s own domestic economic development. China does not view itself as a superpower or a hegemon.’27 Ambrose **Evans-Pritchard** seems to buy the Communist Party’s historical and cultural arguments, writing that ‘The Chinese have no recent history of sweeping territorial expansion (except Tibet) … [T]he Confucian ethic will over time incline China to a quest for global as well as national concord.’28 A critique of the irredentist paradigm **Beijing’s irredentist paradigm rests on three key propositions: that China is an exceptional great power with limited aims; that China is belligerent and uncompromising only over the territory it now claims as rightfully its own, but nothing beyond; and that China will never seek hegemony or a sphere of influence**. For the purposes of accurately assessing Chinese intentions and crafting appropriate policy responses, **accepting this paradigm is deeply problematic**, for several reasons. **It lends undue credence to Chinese propaganda** While the official Chinese narrative offers a plausible explanation for China’s combative behaviour, it does not necessarily follow that the country will not be assertive in other areas. To make the point bluntly, **if an adversary says ‘I will kill your neighbour, but I will not kill you’, and then kills your neighbour, this does not prove that you are safe, only that your adversary is capable of murder**. **It lowers the costs of aggression for China and could mitigate the effects of the security dilemma** Many theorists, including defensive realists, argue that the security dilemma acts as a powerful disincentive against a state taking strong, unilateral action to enhance control over its external environment. Other states might interpret that action as indicative of aggressive intentions and therefore see it as threatening, causing them to take counteractions. As a result, the state that acted first might find that it has effectually decreased rather than increased its own security.29 This dynamic could be attenuated, however, if a state found a way to cloak strong, even aggressive external action in a rationale that limited the alarm caused to other states. In such a circumstance, even a closeted revisionist30 state could pay a discounted price, in the form of relatively weak counteraction by its neighbours, for moves that would ordinarily galvanise more determined and multilateral opposition. **It legitimises questionable Chinese territorial claims** The territorial holdings and borders of a state tend to fluctuate through history. These fluctuations are greater in the case of a large state with a long history. The principle that a state should today control every bit of territory it claims to have controlled at some time in the past is naive and unrealistic. Many of today’s states have ‘lost’ territory, yet do not demand its return under the threat of military action. As Frank Ching points out, **China has been much more of a beneficiary than a victim of expansionism**: ‘China grew by subjugating neighbouring peoples,’ he writes, ‘such as those who lived in what’s now called Xinjiang, whose very name – “new territory” – confirms the fact that it didn’t use to be part of China.’31 **The willingness of the Chinese government to resort to violence to defend its territorial claims is out of proportion to the strength of many of these claims**. In particular, the country’s claim over almost the entire South China Sea based on ‘historical usage’ by Chinese mariners is patently absurd, analogous to the United States claiming ownership of the Pacific Ocean between the US west coast and the Hawaiian islands. This claim, along with China’s occupation of features within the EEZ of the Philippines, and its insistence that Chinese-held rocks, shoals and sandbars in the Spratly group are entitled to the rights legally bestowed on ‘islands’, have all been invalidated by the arbitration process provided for in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which Beijing is a signatory. China could make a reasonably good case for some of its other claims if it chose to respect the accepted process that is already in place. Other countries should encourage China to take full advantage of the applicable international laws and institutions to seek redress for its grievances. Acquiescing in any way to the idea that China has the right to settle its political disputes with its smaller neighbours through coercion or brute force is a moral and political failure, with negative long-term consequences for the project of civilising international affairs. **It allows China to practise a form of extortion against other states** All governments recognise that the notion of defending national territory under threat of being seized by foreigners has a powerful mobilising effect on public opinion. The territorial disputes involving China tap into deep historical wellsprings of wounded national pride. Consequently, China benefits from a mass-public version of the ‘madman theory’,32 whereby the Chinese public is beyond thinking rationally about this issue, and the Chinese government unable to resist citizens’ demands for fear of being overthrown, meaning that other countries must accommodate Chinese claims. Many have warned that foreign governments should avoid making policies that inflame **Chinese nationalism**.33 **It is questionable, however, whether nationalistic public opinion really drives Chinese behaviour with regard to the disputed territories**. **To at least some extent, the reverse is true**.34 Moreover, Beijing has frequently facilitated demonstrations of public outrage against foreigners and then used this outrage as leverage in China’s foreign relations.35 Other governments make Beijing’s problems their own when they honour the communist regime’s need to satisfy the demands of a nationalistic Chinese public. **They reward Beijing for bad behaviour – for its playing up of territorial disputes in domestic propaganda, sometimes with unintended results, and its intentional cultivation of visible public anger as a means of signalling to foreigners that the Chinese government has no room to retreat or compromise**. **It could incentivise China to raise new irredentist claims in the future** Beyond the territory now encompassed or claimed by the People’s Republic, there are additional territories over which China might claim some form of historical association. The late historian Ramesh Chandra Majumdar observed, ‘It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire forever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.’36 Chinese claims have evolved, or more properly expanded, in keeping with its evolution from a poor, revolution-wracked underachiever into an emerging great power. The Republic of China cartographers who first drew a nine-dashed line on a map of the South China Sea in 1946 intended it to delineate Chinese-claimed islands, but not the surrounding ocean. The People’s Republic’s 1958 ‘Declaration on the Territorial Sea’ claimed ownership of South China Sea islands and the territorial waters around them, but recognised that they were separated from the Chinese mainland by ‘high seas’. The Chinese government did not begin to assert that it had ‘historic rights’ to all the resources contained within the nine-dashed line until 1998.37 Similarly, China’s claims in the East China Sea are of recent vintage. A 1953 edition of the People’s Daily noted that the ‘Senkaku’ (not Diaoyu) islands belonged to the Ryukyu archipelago, then and now Japanese territory. An atlas published by a government-owned press in 1958 depicted the Senkakus as part of Japan.38 A possible future target is strategically important Okinawa. In 2013, Chinese commentators with government connections publicly questioned Japan’s ownership of the Ryukyu islands, which include Okinawa and its many US military bases. Separate articles making this point appeared in the Communist Party-run People’s Daily and Global Times, as well as a magazine affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.39 Additionally, Chinese PLA General Luo Yuan said in a media interview in 2013 that the islands were part of the Chinese tributary system as early as 1372, and that Japan stole them in 1872 during a period of relative Chinese weakness. In making this argument, Luo added the Ryukyus to the list of territories lost during the Century of Humiliation alongside Taiwan. ‘We can say with certainty’, Luo concluded, ‘that the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan.’40 **A sphere-of-influence mentality China’s irredentist claims cover an area so vast that it is already tantamount to a sphere of influence**. On China’s lengthy eastern coast, for example, the disputed land and maritime territories form a seamless geographic region beginning with the Yellow Sea in the north and continuing southward through the East China Sea, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and the upper and lower halves of the South China Sea, apparently stretching as far south as the Natuna islands. Chinese officials have repeatedly said that they would continue to allow commercial shipping through major sea lanes in these areas, and it is possible that Beijing would make additional concessions to individual rival claimants that accepted its standing invitation to settle claims through bilateral negotiations. But China would nonetheless retain the unequalled privilege of setting the rules for the activities of other states in this zone. Moreover, **China has shown itself to have a sphere-of-influence mentality that is independent of its irredentist claims**. On occasion, Chinese senior officials have revealed that they see China as deserving of deference from ‘smaller countries’. **This attitude is apparent in Beijing’s demands that its neighbours grant privileges to China**.41 The Yellow Sea, for example, is the site of a dispute between China and South Korea over overlapping EEZs. China has exhibited domineering behaviour in this area that has less to do with any sovereignty dispute than with a sense of entitlement due to China’s status as a larger country. The South Korean coastguard has frequently clashed with Chinese fishermen in areas of the Yellow Sea that are unambiguously under Seoul’s administration. Chinese boats approached by South Korean coastguard vessels have frequently tried to ram them and repel boarding officers with pipes, iron bars, knives and hammers. Between 2008 and 2016, Seoul reported that Chinese fishermen had killed two of its coastguardsmen and injured 73.42 In 2010, Washington announced a US aircraft carrier would join US– South Korean naval exercises in response to North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan. Chinese media unleashed a storm of opposition to what it termed US ‘gunboat diplomacy’. The basis of this opposition was not a territorial-sovereignty claim, but rather the lack of deference shown by the United States to China’s desire that a US aircraft carrier not be present in the region. ‘The decision should be made with consideration given to China’s wishes’, said one Chinese commentator. ‘It’s a matter of the dignity of a big country’, said another.43 A few years later, a worsening North Korean missile threat prompted Seoul to consider deploying the US-made Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. Beijing strenuously objected, even though China itself has a similar system in Shandong province to protect the country from North Korean missiles.44 Beijing argued that THAAD could slightly compromise China’s nuclear second-strike capability by using its powerful radar to track Chinese missile launches. The US government said China’s stated concerns were unfounded and invited China to send a delegation for a technical briefing, but the Chinese side refused. When Seoul made the decision in 2016 to deploy THAAD, China responded with several months of economic punishment that ended only when Beijing extracted three important concessions from South Korean President Moon Jae-in about limiting further US–South Korea security cooperation. In this case, China insisted that a marginal Chinese security concern outweighed the compelling security concern of its smaller neighbour, and that Seoul’s insubordination justified harsh Chinese retaliation. While Beijing criticises the US military for conducting patrols and surveillance in the western Pacific rim, Beijing simultaneously claims the right to carry out its own patrols near neighbouring Japan. For example, in July 2017, a PLA Navy surveillance ship sailed through Japanese territorial waters between the main islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. When Japan publicised the incident, the Chinese government said, ‘Japan has ulterior motives with its accusations and hyping up of the situation.’45 That same month, after Japan complained about six Chinese bombers flying over the Miyako Strait that separates the Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa (but that does not lie within Japanese territorial airspace), China’s defence ministry released a statement saying, ‘The relevant side should not make a fuss about nothing or over-interpret, it will be fine once they get used to it.’46 Beijing has gone so far as to demand that Japan stop scrambling aircraft to observe Chinese planes and ships operating near its territory – something every country with an air force does routinely, including China. On one occasion in 2015, a Chinese defence-ministry spokesman said Japan’s ‘following of, surveillance and interference with Chinese ships and aircraft’ was ‘threatening [their] safety’. He called on Japan to ‘stop behavior that hampers Chinese freedom of flight’.47 The statement was blatantly hypocritical considering the crash between the Chinese fighter aircraft and the American P-3 in 2001, and the multiple cases of Chinese vessels ramming foreign ships. Elsewhere, **Beijing does not refrain from leveraging its strong economic position to influence other countries’ views on important political issues in which China has an interest**. Phnom Penh’s effort to support Beijing by blocking Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) criticism of China’s South China Sea claims, for example, is well known.48 Cambodia has also helped China to achieve its aim of reducing the US military presence in the region. It cancelled military exercises with the United States and Australia in 2017, and it sent home a US Navy Seabee construction unit that had been providing humanitarian assistance for nine years.49 As elsewhere, the Chinese have demonstrated a hankering for exclusivity and control in Cambodia. \* \* \* To the extent that Beijing is successful in promoting the perception that its assertive foreign and military policies are motivated by legitimate national grievances and overwhelming public pressure, China’s neighbours are more likely to see the country’s policies as reasonable, its aims as strictly limited and its profile as that of an exceptionally benevolent great power. **Given that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that China is a revisionist state disguised as a status quo state, and that it would still desire a sphere of influence even in the absence of any territorial disputes, this may be a strategic miscalculation**. **International-relations theory offers two competing models of inter-state conflict: the deterrence model and the spiral model**.50 The two models **prescribe nearly opposite policy responses to an assertive state**, depending on the diagnosis of its root motivations. The deterrence model treats assertive states as expansionist and sees their primary goal as grabbing territory, resources and power. In this view, **appeasement will only encourage further expansionism**. **The proper response by threatened states is to signal resolute resistance as early as possible: the assertive state will be harder to defeat the more resources it gains control of**. The spiral model, on the other hand, sees conflict as a tragic misunderstanding. In this model, the assertive state perceives itself as fundamentally insecure, and its seeming bellicosity is driven by an impulse to protect itself. Other states are advised to make themselves appear less threatening to pacify the assertive state and alleviate the risk of conflict, in particular by making unilateral concessions demonstrating a decrease in both their intent and ability to harm the assertive state. China’s neighbours face a choice between acquiescing to Beijing’s territorial demands and trusting in its assurances that China is a harmless giant, or standing firm against what may be viewed as unreasonable Chinese demands stemming from an appetite for power limited only by opportunity and feasibility. In making this decision, they would be wise to remember that **other historical great powers did not rely on claims of recovering ‘territory left behind by our ancestors’ to establish the Monroe Doctrine, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the Warsaw Pact**. **Wrapping the country’s policies in a cloak of irredentism may serve China’s interests well, but could be diverting attention away from the threat of Chinese encroachment**.

**Governance structure proves – it’s geared toward revisionism**

**Friedberg 2018**

[Aaron L, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Competing with China”, Survival, Vol. 60, No. 3]

The sources of Chinese conduct While novel in certain respects, the policies now being pursued by Xi Jinping are a response to the same forces, and to a similar blend of ambition and anxiety, as those that shaped the policies of his predecessors. Indeed, rather than being a radical departure from the past, Xi’s approach is actually a lineal descendant of the one put in place under Deng in the early 1990s. Before turning to a brief description of current Chinese strategy and the process through which it evolved, it is important to identify the underlying factors that have been central in shaping it. Three, in particular, stand out. Geopolitics Like virtually every other fast-rising power in history (including the United States), **China seeks to reshape the international environment, starting with its immediate neighbourhood, in ways that better reflect its strength and serve its interests**. The nation’s rulers want to secure China’s ‘place in the sun’: they aim to alter geographical boundaries, institutional structures, rules, norms and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when their country was relatively weak, and which they therefore regard as illegitimate and, in certain respects, threatening. History China is not just any rising power; it is a nation with a long and proud history as the leading centre of East Asian civilisation and a more recent, inglorious experience of domination and humiliation at the hands of foreign intruders. **China’s leaders see their country as not merely rising, but rather returning to a position of regional pre-eminence that it once held and which they (and many of their people) regard as natural and appropriate**. Regime **China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian regime that is determined at all costs to retain its exclusive grip on political power, and which feels itself to be constantly under threat from enemies, foreign and domestic**. **These facts have a profound impact on every aspect of policy, internal and external**. A democratic China would no doubt have its differences with other countries, including the United States. But **the illiberal character of the current regime shapes how it perceives threats, and how it defines its interests and goes about pursuing them**. **CCP leaders believe that the United States and its liberal-democratic allies are implacably opposed to them on ideological grounds and that the US, in particular, seeks not only to encircle and contain China but to undermine its current regime by promoting ‘splitism’ (that is, separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan) and ‘peaceful evolution’ (that is, the spread of liberal-democratic beliefs among the Chinese population)**.24 Warding off these threats requires that Beijing exert greater control over events around China’s periphery and in the international system as a whole, while continuously refining its capabilities for domestic surveillance and repression. In addition to coercion, the regime has sought to guard against ideological subversion and to bolster domestic political support; it has done this by managing the national economy in ways intended to sustain growth and employment, and by promulgating a distinctive, state-manufactured form of popular nationalism. China’s pervasive (and still expanding) system of domestic propaganda and ‘patriotic education’ emphasises the wrongs done to China by foreign powers during the ‘century of humiliation’ and the essential (and as yet unfinished) role of the CCP in righting those wrongs. Together with the promise of continuing improvements in living standards, **nationalism is the primary prop on which the regime relies for its legitimacy**. In recent years **Beijing has also made increasing use of crises and confrontations over issues of history, territorial control and national pride to mobilise popular sentiment and deflect the frustrations of the Chinese people outwards, toward alleged foreign enemies, including Japan and the United States**. Especially if economic growth falters, militant nationalism and ‘standing up’ to foreign enemies are likely to become increasingly important parts of the CCP’s strategy for retaining its hold on power. Insecure about their own legitimacy, China’s rulers believe that the stronger their country appears abroad, the stronger the regime will be at home.

**2NC Turns Heg**

**Successful Chinese expansion destroys the liberal order**

**Brands 2017**

[Hal, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 12/14/17, “Trump Could Actually Make Democracy Great Again. Don't Scoff.,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-14/trump-could-actually-make-democracy-great-again-don-t-scoff>]

Third, the best way of promoting liberal values over the long run is to sustain a broader international system in which **democracies**, rather than hostile autocracies, are **geopolitically dominant** -- even if that requires working with friendly authoritarians in the short run. When Woodrow Wilson spoke of making the world safe for democracy during World War I, he was not calling for a crusade to spread democracy across the globe. He was arguing that America must stop authoritarian regimes -- in that case, the Kaiser’s Germany -- from becoming geopolitically dominant in a way that would ultimately make it difficult for democracies anywhere to thrive. Likewise, during the Cold War, the U.S. regularly cut deals with friendly dictators in China, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the service of containing communism, and thereby preserving an international system in which liberal values could survive and flourish. Today, the **single most important thing** the U.S. can do to enhance the long-term prospects for the spread of democracy is to prevent Russia and China from overturning -- or even severely disrupting -- the stable and broadly liberal international system it has long worked to construct. To the extent that Washington can keep China from becoming the supreme power in East Asia, to the extent it can stop Moscow from restoring its lost sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it can **create the ideological and geopolitical space** for liberal values to flourish -- even if doing so requires cooperating with questionable regimes in Bangkok, Singapore and Warsaw along the way.